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Branded Drug Companies Are Successfully Asserting the Doctrine of
Equivalents in Hatch-Waxman Litigation
Christopher M. Holman ∗
ABSTRACT
This article reports the results of a study analyzing every Federal
Circuit decision the author could find dating back to 2005 that
applies the doctrine equivalents (DOE) in the context of
pharmaceutical patent litigation, and in particular infringement
lawsuits brought against Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA) applicants by branded drug companies under the HatchWaxman Act. The results of this study show that pharmaceutical
innovators were prevailing against would-be generic competitors
under the DOE both prior to, and subsequent to, a 2007 article by
Professors Lemley and Allison describing the demise of the doctrine
equivalents, but that patentees’ success rate has improved markedly
in recent years. This article is a follow-up to another Holman
Report I published last year that focused on application of the DOE
to biomolecule claim limitation, Ajinomoto v. ITC, the Doctrine of
Equivalents, and Biomolecule Claim Limitations at the Federal
Circuit.
The doctrine of equivalents is judge-made law in the U.S. that, under certain circumstances,
allows a court to find a party liable for patent infringement even though the accused product or
process does not literally infringe an asserted patent claim. Prior to 2000, critics were
complaining that courts were applying the doctrine in an overly permissive, i.e., patenteefriendly manner that was essentially allowing the exception to swallow the rule. 1 Some argued
that the doctrine “lack[ed] a coherent vision,” others that it had become the most controversial
doctrine in all of patent law. 2

Christopher M. Holman, Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law; Senior Fellow,
Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University; and
Executive Editor, Biotechnology Law Report.
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John R. Allison and Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 Stan. L. Rev.
955 (2007).
2
Id. (citing sources).
1

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4027544

PRE-PRINT VERSION
In 2000, the Federal Circuit substantially raised the bar for patent owners seeking to prove
infringement under the doctrine equivalents in Festo I, an en banc decision that established an
absolute bar against applying the doctrine equivalents to a claim limitation in cases in which the
patentee had narrowed that limitation during prosecution of the patent. 3 This was a substantial
doctrinal shift, given that narrowing claim amendments are very common in patent prosecution.
As a practical matter, Festo I severely undermined the doctrine and its purpose, which is to
prevent “fraud on the patent” by “unscrupulous copyists” that seek to evade liability through
insubstantial changes to the invention that circumvent the literal language of the claims. Two
years later, the Supreme Court significantly tempered the draconian absolute bar of Festo I,
replacing it (in Festo II) with a rebuttable presumption that a narrowing claim amendment
surrenders all equivalents, and identifying specific circumstances under which the presumption
might be overcome, i.e., when the alleged equivalent was unforeseeable at the time of the
amendment, or only tangentially related to whatever it was that prompted the narrowing
amendment. 4
Although Festo II attenuated the harshness of the presumption originally set forth in Festo I, it
was still viewed as a substantial heightening of the bar compared to pre-2000 law, rendering it
less likely that a patent owner would be able to prevail under the doctrine. In a 2007 law review
article, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, Professors Lemley and Allison
reported the findings of their empirical study of doctrine equivalent decisions before and after the
Festo decisions. They concluded that, surprisingly, the Festo decisions had “surprisingly little
effect on the actual outcome of doctrine of equivalents cases, and even less effect on the subset
of cases dealing directly with prosecution history estoppel.” 5 Even more significantly, they
found that, even under the relatively permissive doctrine of equivalents rules in place before
2000, “the doctrine of equivalents was already near death by the late 1990s,” and that district
courts are more likely to reject doctrine of equivalents claims today than ever before.”
Lemley and Allison’s conclusion, that the doctrine of equivalents was near death in 2000 and in
a state of continuing decline, was echoed in a 2010 article by David Schwartz entitled Explaining
the Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents. Professor Schwartz proposed that the “demise of the
doctrine of equivalents” was the consequence of two complementary forces the he referred to as
“doctrinal reallocation” and “doctrinal displacement.”
In a December 2020 blogpost, Kevin Noonan (of Patent Docs) commented that “[a]fter more
than two decades of being the red-headed stepchild of patent infringement before the Federal
Circuit, infringement under the doctrine of equivalents has made a dramatic comeback in the past
few years, the Court affirming plaintiffs asserting their patents under the doctrine six times
(versus denying DOE infringement on the basis of prosecution history estoppel twice, on the
basis of the dedication-disclaimer estoppel twice, and finding no equivalents twice).” 6 In
particular, he pointed to two decisions, both involving the same patent, in which the Federal
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc).
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
5
Id.
6
Kevin E. Noonan, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Apotex, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2020), Patent Docs (December 27, 2020), available at
https://www.patentdocs.org/2020/12/eli-lilly-co-v-apotex-inc-fed-cir-2020.html (last visited February 6, 2021).
3
4
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Circuit affirmed a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Hospira, Inc. and Eli Lilly & Co. v. Apotex, Inc. (both discussed below).
I concur with Noonan’s observation that in recent years the Federal Circuit has become more
receptive to allegations of infringement under the doctrine equivalents. One notable example
from 2019 that illustrates this point comes to mind. In Amgen v. Sandoz, an opinion written by
long-tenured Federal Circuit Judge Alan Lourie, the judge stated that “[t]he doctrine of
equivalents applies only in exceptional cases.” 7 On a petition for rehearing, the panel granted
rehearing “to the extent that” the “applies only in exceptional cases” language of the original
decision was deleted from the original opinion. This correction of Judge Lourie’s statement is
consistent with my own observation that it is no longer an exceptional event when a patentee
prevails under the doctrine of equivalents. 8
In this article, I report the results of a study I conducted analyzing every Federal Circuit decision
I could find dating back to 2005 that applies the doctrine equivalents (DOE) in the context of
pharmaceutical patent litigation, and in particular infringement lawsuits brought against
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) applicants by branded drug companies under the
Hatch-Waxman Act. The results of this study show that pharmaceutical innovators were
prevailing against would-be generic competitors under the DOE both prior to, and subsequent to,
Lemley and Allison’s article describing the demise of the doctrine equivalents, but that
patentees’ success rate has improved markedly in recent years. In the first section of this article,
I summarize the results in a number of cases in which the patentee branded drug company
prevailed under the DOE against an ANDA applicant. In the following section, I summarize
decisions in which the Federal Circuit found a branded drug company likely to succeed in
proving infringement under the DOE, in the context of the appeal of a preliminary injunction.
The third section of the article summarize the cases I found in which an allegation of
infringement under the DOE failed. This article is a follow-up to another Holman Report I
published last year that focused on application of the DOE to biomolecule claim limitation,
Ajinomoto v. ITC, the Doctrine of Equivalents, and Biomolecule Claim Limitations at the
Federal Circuit. 9

Decisions finding infringement under the DOE
In the following decisions, the Federal Circuit affirmed a finding that an Orange Book-listed
patent would be infringed by an ANDA applicant’s proposed generic product under the doctrine
of equivalents.

Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma (2006)
In 1989 AstraZeneca launched DIPRIVAN as an original pharmaceutical composition used to
induce and maintain general anesthesia and sedation in patients. DIPRIVAN consists of an
injectible oil-in-water emulsion containing propofol, or 2,6–diisopropyl phenol, as its active
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 923 F.3d 1023, 1029 (Fed. Cir.).
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 776 F. App'x 707 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
9
Christopher M. Holman, Ajinomoto v. ITC, the Doctrine of Equivalents, and Biomolecule Claim Limitations at the
Federal Circuit, 39 Biotechnology Law Report 3 (2020).
7
8
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ingredient. In 1990, AstraZeneca became aware that patients using DIPRIVAN were suffering
from postoperative infections linked to DIPRIVAN. AstraZeneca researchers sought to address
the problem through the use of preservatives, but most of the preservatives they tested were
found to be ineffective. Ultimately, the inventors of the patents at issue in the case discovered
that one preservative in particular, disodium edetate, was unexpectedly effective in retarding
microbial growth in the propofol formulation for at least twenty-four hours, without disrupting
the oil-in-water emulsion. AstraZeneca subsequently developed an improved DIPRIVAN
formulation consisting of edetate along with other ingredients present in the original formulation.
In March 1995, the inventors applied for a patent on their improved DIPRIVAN formulation,
ultimately resulting in the three patents at issue in the case, all of which share a common written
description. The patents claim propofol formulations comprising “edetate.”
In 1995, ESI (a generic drug company) learned of the reports of infection relating to original
DIPRIVAN, and that AstraZeneca had reformulated its composition by adding an antimicrobial
agent. ESI decided to develop a similar generic formulation. 10 After reviewing AstraZeneca's
′520 patent, scientists at ESI began screening antimicrobial agents in an effort to replace the
edetate in the improved DIPRIVAN formulation with a different antimicrobial agent. They
identified the calcium trisodium salt of diethylenetriaminepentaacetic acid (pentetate), which is
also referred to as DTPA, based on a consideration of a number of factors, including that the
“product must be approvable as an ANDA without clinical or safety studies ... [and] must match
the reference product characteristics and stability profile” of AstraZeneca's improved
formulation. They understood that since calcium trisodium DTPA is “structurally similar to
edetate, product stability is predicted to be unaffected.” Their studies showed that calcium
trisodium DTPA produced the same characteristics and stability profile as improved DIPRIVAN,
and ESI ultimately developed a generic propofol formulation employing calcium trisodium
DTPA as the antimicrobial additive. ESI obtained a patent on its pharmaceutical composition.
AstraZeneca sued in a Hatch-Waxman action, and the district court found that the proposed
generic product would infringe AstraZeneca’s patents. In reaching this result, the district court
construed the term “edetate” to mean “EDTA as well as compounds structurally related to EDTA
regardless of how they are synthesized.” Based on this claim construction, the district court
found that calcium trisodium DTPA is in “edetate” because it is a “structural analog” of EDTA,
and thus concluded that the claims would be infringed literally and/or under the doctrine
equivalents by the proposed generic.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the district court had misconstrued “edetate,” and that
the proper construction of the term is “EDTA and derivatives of EDTA, such as salts, but not
including structural analogs.” 11 The court further found that, under the proper interpretation of
the term, calcium trisodium DTPA is not an edetate, and for that reason none of the asserted
claims are literally infringed. But the court then proceeded to affirm the district court’s finding

ESI filed the Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) for the generic propofol emulsion, and later assigned
it to the defendant Mayne.
11
Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., 467 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
10
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of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, which was based on the lower court’s finding
that the differences existing between calcium trisodium DTPA and edetate were insubstantial.
In reaching this conclusion, the district court performed a function-way-result analysis. The court
identified the “function” of edetate as “retard[ing] microbial growth in propofol oil-in-water
emulsions.” The court then defined the “way” that edetate worked as by metal ion chelation, and
found that the “result” achieved was “retard[ing] microbial growth to the extent required by the
microbiological test set forth in the claims.” The court found that calcium trisodium DTPA
similarly retards microbial growth in an oil-in-water emulsion by metal ion chelation to retard
the growth of the microorganisms to the extent required by a test set forth in the patent claims.
On appeal, Mayne argued that the district court clearly erred in defining the “way” as metal ion
chelation, and that the proper definition of “way” is a narrower one, i.e., one that incorporates the
specific metal ions that are chelated, the strength of the bonds that are formed during chelation,
and the stability constants. But the Federal Circuit rejected that argument, concluding that the
district court had not clearly erred in defining “way” as metal ion chelation and in finding that
that is the “way” in which calcium trisodium DTPA functions as an antimicrobial agent, pointing
out that Mayne itself had argued to the FDA that calcium trisodium DTPA is an effective
antimicrobial agent in its generic propofol formulation because “of its ability to chelate divalent
metal ions.”
Mayne also argued that the lack of known interchangeability between edetate and DTPA as an
antimicrobial agent precluded a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
Mayne pointed to the fact that it was able to receive a patent on its own DTPA formulation as
evidence of the lack of known interchangeability. However, the Federal Circuit rejected this
argument, finding that, “[i]n fact, the absence of known interchangeability underscores that the
patent applicant had no reason to foresee and claim DTPA in this combination.”
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court's conclusion that Mayne's generic propofol
formulation infringes the patents in suit under the doctrine of equivalents was not clearly
erroneous, and that, indeed, the conclusion was consistent with the findings made by the district
court that calcium trisodium DTPA was specifically chosen for the generic propofol formulation
because of its structural similarities to edetate and the likelihood that it would match the product
characteristics and stability profile of Abraxis' improved DIPRIVAN formulation.

Pozen Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc. (2012)
Pozen, in partnership with GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”), markets a combination of sumatriptan and
naproxen called Treximet®, used in the treatment of migraines. 12 The ′183 patent claims a
multilayer pharmaceutical tablet with a triptan, such as sumatriptan, and a NSAID in separate
layers that dissolve independently. Pozen sued ANDA applicants Par and DRL under HatchWaxman. The district court held that under the doctrine of equivalents Par and DRL's ANDA
products infringe claim 2 of the ′183 patent, which is dependent on claim 1, and reads:

12

Pozen Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 696 F.3d 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

5
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1. A multilayer pharmaceutical tablet comprising naproxen and a triptan and,
wherein:
a) substantially all of said triptan is in a first layer of said tablet and
substantially all of said naproxen is in a second, separate layer; and
b)said first layer and said second layer are in a side by side arrangement
such that the dissolution of said naproxen occurs independently of said
triptan.
2. The tablet of claim 1, wherein said naproxen is in the form of naproxen sodium
between 200 and 600 mg.

The parties agreed that the claim term “dissolution of said naproxen occurs independently of said
triptan” means “[d]issolution of naproxen ... and triptan from the multilayer tablet ... occurs in
the same amount of time ± 10% as when the same amount of naproxen ... and triptan are given
separately.” The ANDA filers argued that the district court should have required proof that the
active agents in their generic products achieved dissolution in about the same time (± 10%) it
would take for either of the active agents to achieve dissolution when taken alone, and that the
record evidence had not proven this. However, relying upon the generic companies’ FDA filings
and expert testimony presented at trial, the district court found that the ANDA products perform
the same function in the same way to achieve the same results and therefore satisfy the
independent dissolution limitation under the doctrine of equivalents. For example Pozen's expert
noted that Par's ANDA product was specifically formulated to achieve complete and independent
dissolution, and in its ANDA, Par represented to the FDA that the sumatriptan and naproxen in
its ANDA product dissolves completely and independently from each other. Similarly, DRL's
ANDA product achieves independent dissolution “by the way it formulates and manufactures the
tablets.”
The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that
Although there was no direct evidence comparing the rate of dissolution of the
ANDA products to that of the agents individually, no such actual comparison was
necessary. Under the doctrine of equivalents analysis Pozen need only show that
the ANDA products performed the same function in the same way to achieve the
same result as the claimed elements of the ′183 patent. Par and DRL provided
expert testimony to show that the sumatriptan dissolves completely and
independently from the naproxen and that the naproxen dissolves completely and
independently from the sumatriptan in their ANDA products. Also, there is
probative evidence from Par's ANDA and comparison of DRL's ANDA products
dissolution profile showing that their sumatriptan and naproxen dissolve
completely and independently from another. As a result, Appellants offer no basis
for setting aside the district court's finding. Indeed, there is sufficient evidence
showing that logically if the agents dissolve in the same way they would if the
other agent was not present, their dissolution takes the same amount of time it
would taken when given separately. Thus, the district court did not clearly err in
relying on Pozen's expert testimony and concluding that Appellants' ANDA

6
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products meet the “independent dissolution” limitation as recited in claim 1 of the
′183 patent under the doctrine of equivalents. 13

The district court construed the phrase “substantially all of said triptan is in a first layer of said
tablet and substantially all of said naproxen is in a second, separate layer” as meaning “[a]t least
90%, and preferably greater than 95%, of the total triptan present in the tablet is included within
one distinct layer and at least 90%, and preferably greater than 95%, of the naproxen present in
the tablet is included within a second distinct layer.”
It was undisputed that the first layer of Par's ANDA tablet “contains 100% of the tablet's
sumatriptan, along with 15% of the tablet's naproxen, with the remaining 85% of the naproxen in
the second layer. DRL's ANDA tablet has 100% of the tablet's naproxen and 15% of the tablet's
sumatriptan in the first layer, with the remaining 85% of the sumatriptan in the second layer.”
Defendant Par argued that the district court improperly treated the claim term “substantially all”
as a precise quantity entitled to the doctrine of equivalents, when in fact it is really a “fuzzy”
quantitative limitation not entitled to equivalents. Par asserted that the word “substantially” was
used to capture values lower than 100%, and indeed the district court had construed the term to
include any amount as low as 90%. As such, Par argued that Pozen should not be able to reach
below 90% “to encompass equivalents of equivalents.”
Defendant DRL argued that the district court had erred in granting Pozen a range of equivalency
for the ′183 patent beyond the scope of equivalency determined through claim construction. DRL
asserted that in the cases cited by the district court, the degree to which the accused product fell
outside the specifically claimed range was miniscule in comparison to the amount their ANDA
product falls outside of the claimed range. In DRLs product, sumatriptan only makes up 85% of
one layer; 5% less than the minimum 90% set forth in the construction of the term “substantially
all.”
The Federal Circuit acknowledged its own precedent supporting the proposition that where “a
patentee has brought what would otherwise be equivalents of a limitation into the literal scope of
the claim, the doctrine of equivalents is unavailable to further broaden the scope of the claim.” 14
The court found that in this case, however, although the claim language itself is a qualitative
measure, the claim construction pulls directly from the specification to give the term
“substantially all” a quantitative definition, specifically, “at least 90%, and preferably greater
than 95%,” and that the Federal Circuit has previously concluded that the doctrine of equivalents
is not foreclosed with respect to claimed ranges. In this case, Pozen never stated that “at least
90%, and preferably greater than 95%” should be an absolute floor, and the court concluded that
under the doctrine of equivalents a tablet layer with 85% of the agent can be fairly characterized
as an insubstantial change from a tablet layer with 90% of the agent.
With respect to the district court's analysis of infringement of the “substantially all” limitation,
the parties' experts agreed that the function of the claimed multilayer tablet was to have
13
14

Id.
Id.
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“separate, distinct layers of sumatriptan and naproxen. The way in which this function is
achieved is by formulating the sumatriptan and naproxen in different manners to create physical
barriers. The result is that substantially naproxen is separated from the [sumatriptan], thereby
providing independent dissolution.”
The district court found that Par's ANDA product performs essentially the same function, by
segregating the naproxen and sumatriptan into two layers. This is achieved by formulating them
differently, specifically, by using a polymer binder to form 15% of the naproxen into granules
which are added to the sumatriptan layer. The result is that one layer has 100% of the
sumatriptan with 15% of the naproxen, and another layer has the remaining 85% of the
naproxen, substantially all separated and segregated into two layers. Therefore, the district court
determined, Par's ANDA product performs the same function, in the same way, and achieves the
same result, and satisfies all of the limitations of the ′183 patent under the doctrine of
equivalents.
The district court also found that DRL's ANDA product performs the same function of achieving
separate, distinct layers by segregating the triptan and naproxen. Id. This is achieved by
granulating 15% of the sumatriptan with a polymer binder and then spraying it on the naproxen
which has been granulated with a polymer binder as well; the remaining 85% of the sumatriptan
forms the other layer. “Thus, substantially all the triptan is segregated and separated into the
equivalent of a first distinct layer, in an equivalent side-by-side arrangement, and this achieves
the result of independent dissolution.” Therefore, the district court determined, DRL's ANDA
product performs the same function, in the same way, and achieves the same result, and satisfies
all of the limitations of the ′183 patent under the doctrine of equivalents.
The generic defendants argued that their ANDA products do not achieve separate distinct layers
because one of the layers has both agents. However, their products contain a bilayer tablet, with
100% of one agent in one layer, and 85% of the other agent in the other layer. The Federal
Circuit agreed with the district court that this structure is insubstantially different from a bilayer
tablet with 90% of the total therapeutic agent present in the tablet included in a single layer.
Based on the evidence, the district court had not clearly err in finding that Par's ANDA products
and DRL's ANDA products met the “substantially all” limitation of the ′183 patent under the
doctrine of equivalents.
Writing in dissent, Judge Clevenger argued that
Even if the equivalent layer notion has merit, it still cannot be disconnected from
the language of the claim. The equivalent layer would, in any event, have to be the
equivalent of a more or less pure layer, i.e., one with at least 90% and preferably
95% of the required ingredient in it. How can a layer with only 85% of the
necessary ingredient in it be an equivalent of a layer with at least 90% and
preferably 95% of the required ingredient in it?
...
In my view, the District Court erred by not asking itself if under claim 2 a layer,
viewed from the outside or from the inside, can be equivalent if is numerically

8
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nonequivalent. It cannot. The majority states that “a reasonable person could
determine that a tablet layer with 85% of the agent is within the scope of the
doctrine of equivalents.” Respectfully, I disagree.

As noted by Judge Clevenger in his dissent, the ANDA products were designed to avoid the
claims’ “substantially all” limitation.

Cadence Pharm. Inc. v. Exela PharmSci Inc. (2015)

Cadence Pharmaceuticals Inc. markets an injectable acetaminophen product, which is approved
by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) and is distributed under the name Ofirmev®. 15
The FDA's Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (better known as
the “Orange Book”) lists the ′218 patent in connection with Ofirmev®. One of the Orange Book
listed patents, the ‘281 patent, claims a “method for preparing an aqueous solution [of
acetaminophen], while preserving for a prolonged period, comprising de-oxygenation of
the solution by bubbling with at least one inert gas and/or placing under vacuum, until the
oxygen content is below 2 ppm . . ..”
Exela filed an ANDA seeking FDA approval of a generic equivalent of Ofirmev®, and Cadence
sued for infringement of the patent. The generic company sought to avoid the patent claim by
deoxygenating the water prior to dissolving acetaminophen in it. This did avoid literal
infringement, because the claim, as interpreted by the district court, required deoxygenation of a
solution that already comprises acetaminophen. Nonetheless, the district court found
infringement under the doctrine equivalents. The district court found that the timing of the
addition of the active ingredient did not matter and ruled that the differences between the
claimed steps and Exela's method were insubstantial. The district court relied on the testimony
of Cadence's expert, Dr. Orr, “that adding acetaminophen before or after the deoxygenation step
would have no impact on the stability of the final product.” Dr. Orr explained that this was so
because “in both cases you're trying to deoxygenate your solution. In both cases, you're
employing bubbling to do that. And the results that you achieve under this prolonged period of—
of bubbling is still a solution of less than two parts per million.”
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that this testimony supported the district court's finding
that changing the timing of the deoxygenation step was an insubstantial difference. 16 The Federal
Circuit further noted that the correctness of this conclusion was confirmed by “the district court's
finding and Exela's accession that its formulation is, in fact, stable.”
Exela further argued that deoxygenating after adding the active ingredient is the “antithesis” of
deoxygenating before adding the active ingredient, and for that reason a finding of infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents would impermissibly “vitiate” a claim limitation. The Federal
Circuit rejected this argument, explaining that:
Exela fundamentally misunderstands the doctrine of claim vitiation. “Vitiation” is
not an exception or threshold determination that forecloses resort to the doctrine
of equivalents, but is instead a legal conclusion of a lack of equivalence based on
15
16

Cadence Pharm. Inc. v. Exela PharmSci Inc., 780 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Cadence Pharm. Inc. v. Exela PharmSci Inc., 780 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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the evidence presented and the theory of equivalence asserted. We have repeatedly
reaffirmed this proposition. Characterizing an element of an accused product as
the “antithesis” of a claimed element is also a conclusion that should not be used
to overlook the factual analysis required to establish whether the differences
between a claimed limitation and an accused structure or step are substantial vel
non. The determination of equivalence depends not on labels like “vitiation” and
“antithesis” but on the proper assessment of the language of the claimed limitation
and the substantiality of whatever relevant differences may exist in the accused
structure. 17

Intendis GMBH v. Glenmark Pharm. Inc., USA (2016)

Bayer markets Finacea Gel, which contains azelaic acid as the therapeutically active ingredient
in a concentration of 15% by weight and is indicated for the topical treatment of inflammatory
papules and pustules of mild to moderate rosacea. 18 Finacea Gel's inactive ingredients
(excipients) include triglycerides and lecithin.
Glenmark submitted an ANDA seeking approval to market a generic version of Finacea Gel.
Unlike Finacea Gel, the proposed generic product substituted isopropyl myristate for the claimed
triglyceride and lecithin. Bayer sued for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,534,070 (“the ′070
patent”). The asserted claims recite a composition that comprises, inter alia, azelaic acid, a
triglyceride, and lecithin. The district court found infringement, based on its determination that
the isopropyl myristate in Glenmark's generic product met the claims’ triglyceride and lecithin
limitations under the doctrine of equivalents, relying on the function-way-result test.
First, the court found that isopropyl myristate in Glenmark's generic product (“Glenmark's
excipient”) performs substantially the same function as the claimed excipients—namely,
enhancing azelaic acid's penetration of the skin. It reasoned that several experts testified that the
claimed excipients could act as penetration enhancers and that “nothing in the record” indicated
they could not. It also reasoned that Glenmark's ANDA included repeated statements that both
Glenmark's excipient and the claimed excipients function as penetration enhancers. It noted that
Glenmark “should not be permitted to liken their product to the claimed composition to support
their bid for FDA approval, yet avoid the consequences of such a comparison for purposes of
infringement.”
Second, the court found that Glenmark's excipient performed in substantially the same way as
the claimed excipients—namely, by disrupting the lipids in the skin's outermost layer, known as
the stratum corneum. It based its finding on testimony by various experts, as supported by
scientific literature.
Third, the court found that Glenmark's excipient obtained substantially the same result as the
claimed excipients—namely, a therapeutically effective azelaic acid composition that is able to
penetrate the skin in order to deliver the active ingredient. It relied on data from the ′070 patent,
Glenmark's own patent application, a skin penetration study, and a clinical trial.
17
18

Id., (citations omitted).
Intendis GMBH v. Glenmark Pharm. Inc., USA, 822 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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The issue on appeal was whether the district court clearly erred when it determined that
triglyceride and lecithin function as penetration enhancers in the claimed compounds. Glenmark
argued that the district court erred in its finding regarding the function prong because Bayer
failed to prove that the claimed excipients function as penetration enhancers in the claimed
composition. According to Glenmark, the fact that the patent was silent as to whether lecithins or
triglycerides function as penetration enhancers was fatal to a finding of infringement. The
Federal Circuit disagreed, stating that “[w]e have never held that a patent must spell out a claim
element's function, way, and result in order for the doctrine of equivalents to apply as to that
element. To the contrary, we have held that when the claims and specification of a patent are
silent as to the result of a claim limitation, we should turn to the ordinary skilled artisan. . . . The
relevant inquiry is what the claim element's function in the claimed composition is to one of skill
in the art, and a fact finder may rely on extrinsic evidence in making this factual
determination.” 19
In response to Glenmark’s assertion that the district court erred in its determination that the
claimed excipients function as penetration enhancers in light of the evidence of record, the
Federal Circuit responded:
We see no clear error in this district court fact finding. Fatal to Glenmark's
argument is its own ANDA submission to the FDA repeatedly referring to the
claimed excipients (triglyceride and lecithin) as penetration enhancers. For
example, Glenmark stated in its filing to the FDA that “[i]sopropyl myristate was
selected as [a] penetration enhancer instead of lecithin and medium chain
triglyceride” under the heading “Selection of penetration enhancer.” Glenmark's
repeated statements to the FDA that the claimed excipients function as penetration
enhancers tend to show that one of skill in the art would understand the claimed
excipients to function as penetration enhancers. We see no reason why a district
court acting as a fact finder should ignore a party's representation to a federal
regulatory body that is directly on point. Based on this record, the district court's
finding regarding the function of the claimed excipients is not clearly erroneous.
In a strange turn of events, Glenmark argued at oral argument to this court that its
statements in its FDA submissions about the claimed excipients (triglyceride and
lecithin) functioning as penetration enhancers should be rejected and cannot be
evidence to support the district court's finding. It argued that “lecithin and
triglycerides are not known to the art as penetration enhancers” and that its
representation to the FDA that they do function as penetration enhancers was a
“guess” and “wrong.” These seemingly extemporaneous arguments do not
persuade us that there is clear error in the district court's decision that isopropyl
myristate in Glenmark's generic product and the claimed triglyceride and lecithin
perform substantially the same function. [W]hen asked whether Glenmark had
notified the FDA of these purported inaccurate representations to the FDA,
Glenmark's counsel was unaware of such notification. 20

19
20

Id.
Id. at 1362-63.
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UCB, Inc. v. Watson Labs. Inc. (2019)

The technology at issue in this decision relates to a transdermal (via the skin) form of delivering
a drug that treats Parkinson's disease. 21 Rotigotine is a drug that has been used since the 1990s
for the treatment of Parkinson's disease.
UCB developed a rotigotine transdermal patch without using water and filed the ’434 patent to
cover such a patch. The FDA approved UCB's rotigotine transdermal patches in May 2007, and
UCB has been selling the product under the brand name Neupro since July 2007. Neupro's
polymer adhesive system is silicone-based.
The only asserted independent claim reads:
1. A transdermal therapeutic system comprising a self-adhesive matrix layer
containing the free base [rotigotine] in an amount effective for the treatment of the
symptoms of Parkinson's syndrome, wherein the matrix is based on [ ] an acrylatebased or silicone-based polymer adhesive system having a solubility of ≥5% (w/w)
for the free base [rotigotine], all of said free base being present in the matrix in the
absence of water; a backing layer inert to the components of the matrix layer; and
a protective foil or sheet covering the matrix layer to be removed prior to use.

Actavis filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) for generic versions of transdermal
rotigotine patches, and UCB filed suit for infringement of the ’434 patent under 35 U.S.C. §
271(e)(2). Actavis’s products use a polyisobutylene adhesive, rather than the claimed acrylatebased or silicone-based polymer adhesives, but the district court found the adhesives in this
context to be substantially similar and that nothing in this case barred application of the doctrine
of equivalents. Actavis did not dispute that its products literally meet every other element of the
asserted claims.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that UCB was not “barred” from
asserting the doctrine of equivalents because of prosecution history estoppel, intentional narrow
claiming, vitiation, or ensnarement. 22
During prosecution of the patent application that resulted in the ‘434 patent, the examiner
imposed a restriction requirement. In response, the applicant elected a group of claims that
included an “acrylate-based or silicone-based polymer adhesive system” limitation, and the
examiner withdrew another group of claims that recited “an adhesive,” without specifying any
particular adhesive. Actavis argued because UCB withdrew the group of claims that were not
limited to silicone- and acrylate-based polymer adhesive systems, it gave up claim scope of
adhesives that are not silicates or acrylates and should not be allowed to recapture that subject
matter through the doctrine of equivalents.
The Federal Circuit found, however, that:
the examiner's restriction requirement did not relate to polyisobutylene, and the
examiner was not communicating anything about the patentability of
21
22

UCB, Inc. v. Watson Labs. Inc., 927 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Id.
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polyisobutylene-based adhesive systems. UCB never added a polyisobutyleneexcluding limitation by amendment, and its election cannot be read as such.
Moreover, even if UCB had claimed “an adhesive” in the elected claims, as Actavis
argues it should have done in order to keep polyisobutylene within the claim scope,
the technical differences that triggered the restriction requirement would still have
remained and still would have required the same restriction[.] Thus, the restriction
requirement here, and UCB's election in response, do not indicate a surrender of
polyisobutylene as an equivalent. 23

The court concluded that UCB had not made a narrowing amendment in respect to the restriction
requirement, and accordingly found no good basis in the prosecution history to bar the
application of the doctrine of equivalents to polyisobutylene-based polymer adhesive systems.
Relatedly, Actavis argued to the district court that UCB had chosen to draft narrow claims and
should not be permitted to expand the scope of those claims through the doctrine of equivalents.
Specifically, Actavis argued that Dr. Mueller, an inventor of the ’434 patent, knew that
polyisobutylene was a polymer that could be used in transdermal patches but chose not to
prosecute a claim broad enough to cover polyisobutylene. On appeal, Actavis made the broader
argument that polyisobutylenes were generally known in the art, citing Dr. Mueller's knowledge
as an example.
The district court disagreed with Actavis, citing the Federal Circuit’s holding in Ring & Pinion
Service Inc. v. ARB Corp. that “[t]here is not, nor has there ever been, a foreseeability limitation
on the application of the doctrine of equivalents” as to claim limitations that have never been
amended or relied on during prosecution, because “[e]xcluding equivalents that were foreseeable
at the time of patenting would directly conflict with [prior Supreme Court and Federal Circuit
case] holdings that ‘known interchangeability’ supports infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.” 24
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that, while “Ring & Pinion does not foreclose consideration
of foreseeability of an asserted equivalent as one factor that may, in some cases, help show that
the facts cannot support infringement under the doctrine of equivalents,” Ring & Pinion did hold
that “foreseeability at the time of claim drafting is not a per se bar to the application of the
doctrine of equivalents.” 25 In this case, the patent’s specification was not shown to rely on or
identify any unique characteristics of acrylate or silicone-based polymer adhesive systems that
would not be present in a polyisobutylene-based system. The court found the fact that the
specification repeatedly recites acrylate- and silicone-based polymers to be irrelevant to the issue
of whether it describes those polymers in a manner that would suggest to a skilled artisan that
polyisobutylene is not an equivalent. Furthermore, the claims also correspond directly to the
specification by reciting all acrylate-based or silicone-based polymer adhesive systems.
Finally, there was no clear evidence that the inventor knew that polyisobutylene is an equivalent.
The Federal Circuit found that “there is not enough indication from the patent specification,
Id.
Id., citing Ring & Pinion, 743 F.3d 831, 834 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
25
Id.
23
24
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claims, or the record evidence of the inventor's knowledge here to conclude that UCB
surrendered polyisobutylene as a possible equivalent. In the absence of such facts, we agree with
the district court that UCB's claiming of acrylates and silicates does not bar treating
polyisobutylenes as an equivalent for infringement purposes.”
The Federal Circuit went on to note that:
as a policy matter that the patent system should not incentivize inventors to claim
equivalents that they had not invented or tested, just because they know of the
possibility of an equivalent, and also should not force inventors to delay filing for
a patent on what they have invented while testing all known possible equivalents
for fear of being unable to assert infringement under the doctrine of equivalents in
the future.

Actavis also argued that UCB's doctrine of equivalents infringement theory should fail because it
vitiates the “acrylate-based or silicone-base polymer adhesive system” limitation of claim 1. The
Federal Circuit did not agree that finding polyisobutylene to be an equivalent gives the element
“an acrylate-based or silicone-based polymer adhesive system” such broad play that the element
would disappear entirely. “The district court did not broaden the right to exclude so widely as to
cover all adhesive systems and vitiate the ‘acrylate-based or silicone-based’ claim language.”
The court also rejected Actavis’s argument that a hypothetical claim including polyisobutylenebased polymers would ensnare the prior art.
Moving to the merits, the Federal Circuit found no clear error with the district court's substantive
application of the doctrine of equivalents. The district court applied the (in)substantial
differences test, under which “[a]n element in the accused device is equivalent to a claim
limitation if the only differences between the two are insubstantial.” 26 The Federal Circuit has
explained that “the substantial differences test may be more suitable ... for determining
equivalence in the chemical arts,” and identified “structural equivalen[cy]” as particularly
relevant when comparing chemical equivalents. 27
The purpose of the adhesive polymer in the disputed claim element is to act as a scaffold for the
drug and to provide adhesion to a patient's skin for the transdermal patch. The district court
found that, at the time the ’434 patent was filed, silicates, acrylates, and polyisobutylenes were
the most commonly used pressure-sensitive adhesives in transdermal patches. The district court
then identified a set of properties that silicates, acrylates, and polyisobutylenes share: they are
pressure-sensitive, adhesive, biologically inert, non-irritating, and non-toxic. Thus, the district
court found that a skilled artisan “would recognize that polyisobutylene is not substantially
different from the classes of adhesives literally within the scope of the claims.”
The district court also made fact findings as to the differences between polyisobutylene and
silicates/acrylates. “Polyisobutylene is an organic polymer, consisting exclusively of carbon and
hydrogen atoms, forming a non-polar backbone, without any functional groups,” and accordingly
is non-polar and hydrophobic. Silicates and polyacrylates, unlike polyisobutylene, may contain
26
27

Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Mylan Institutional LLC v. Aurobindo Pharma Ltd., 857 F.3d 858, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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functional groups that may be polar and/or reactive. So, due to differences in polarity,
polyisobutylene has different adhesiveness compared to acrylate- and silicone-based adhesives.
Further, polyisobutylene, unlike silicone- or acrylate-based polymers, does not allow for
crosslinking agents to be used to increase adhesion or reduce cold-flow. Finally, rotigotine
contains atoms that can interact with certain functional groups that can be present in siliconeand acrylate-based polymers, but rotigotine does not interact significantly with polyisobutylene.
The district court went on to explain, however, that these differences do not matter for how the
claimed invention works, as evidenced by the comparative results between UCB's Neupro
product and the Accused Products, called PIB Neupro (Neupro with polyisobutylene substituted
for silicone).
The district court noted that permeation results for Neupro and PIB Neupro were comparable in
terms of transdermal delivery of rotigotine at the intended wear time of 24 hours, and that
Actavis chose polyisobutylene because it worked just as well as silicone. The district concluded
that “[t]hese results show that the polyisobutylene-based polymer adhesive system did not alter
the way rotigotine is transdermally delivered compared to a silicone-based polymer adhesive
system,” nor did it “alter rotigotine transdermal delivery rates,” showing that “polyisobutylene is
interchangeable with silicone in the claimed polymer adhesive system.” Accordingly, the district
court concluded that “[t]he polyisobutylene-based adhesive system is an insubstantial
modification of the claimed invention.”
On appeal, Actavis argues that the district court erroneously relied on evidence comparing
UCB's branded Neupro product with (a) Actavis's ANDA product and (b) PIB Neupro. But the
district court explicitly stated whether Neupro is or is not an embodiment of the claims is not
dispositive of the infringement question because “infringement requires a comparison of the
accused product (the ANDA product) and the claims.” And the district court only relied on
Neupro and PIB Neupro for points unrelated to water content. The district court observed that
“[b]oth Neupro itself and the ’434 patent in exemplary embodiments use silicone adhesives ...
that have a solubility for rotigotine of less than 0.1%” to make the point that the low solubility of
polyisobutylene was not a concern that would differentiate it from silicates. The district court
also pointed out that Actavis started with Neupro and substituted polyisobutylene for silicone to
make PIB Neupro because it viewed the two as interchangeable. And the district court cited the
comparative permeation studies because they showed no statistical difference in the amount of
rotigotine delivered between the two adhesives. The Federal Circuit found that it was not clear
how any of these conclusions are affected by the water content of Neupro, and that, regardless,
the district court had many non-Neupro-related reasons for finding substantial similarity here.
The Federal Circuit did not find clear error in any of the district court's fact findings as to
polyisobutylene's characteristics as compared to silicates and acrylates. Nor did it find clear error
in the district court's fact findings as to what a skilled artisan would have known about the
interchangeability of polyisobutylene-based adhesives and silicone-based adhesives (i.e., why the
similarities matter more than the differences for the claimed system). Giving credit to those fact
findings, it affirmed the district court's conclusion that the claims were infringed under the
doctrine of equivalents.
15
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Eli Lilly & Co. v. Hospira, Inc. (2019)

Lilly markets the compound pemetrexed in the form of a disodium salt as Alimta®, which is
indicated, both alone and in combination with other active agents, for treating certain types of
non-small cell lung cancer and mesothelioma. 28 Pemetrexed is an antifolate, a class of molecules
which, at the time of the invention in 2001, was “one of the most thoroughly studied classes of
antineoplastic agents.”
Three generic companies filed ANDA’s seeking approval to market generic versions of Alimta
employ a different counterion than Lilly, in particular, tromethamine instead of sodium, i.e,
pemetrexed ditromethamine. Lilly sued for infringement of patent claims that recited, inter alia,
an “administration of pemetrexed disodium” step. The generic companies use of tromethamine
instead of sodium avoided literal infringement, but the district court found infringement under
the doctrine equivalents, and the Federal Circuit affirmed.
The defendant generic companies argued that Lilly was precluded by prosecution history
estoppel from resort to the doctrine of equivalents, based on an amendment made to the infringed
claims during prosecution. As originally filed, the claims broadly recited “administration of an
antifolate.” The examiner rejected an originally filed claim as anticipated by a reference that
disclosed administration of methotrexate (an antifolate). Lilly responded by amending the
relevant claims to recite “administration of pemetrexed disodium” rather than “administration of
an antifolate,” and pointing out that the prior art did not disclose pemetrexed. The rejection with
was withdrawn and the claims issued.
The defendants argued that the amendment surrendered antifolates other than pemetrexed
disodium. On appeal, Lilly did not dispute that the amendment was both narrowing and made
for a substantial reason relating to patentability. However, Lilly argued that the presumption of
estoppel created by the narrowing amendment under Festo’s tangential exception, i.e., Lilly’s
amendment narrowing “an antifolate” to “pemetrexed disodium” was only tangential to the
accused compound, pemetrexed ditromethamine.
The defendant generic companies argued that Lilly had failed to explain why it did not pursue a
narrower amendment literally encompassing pemetrexed ditromethamine, emphasizing the
Federal Circuit’s statement in previous decisions that the tangential exception is “very narrow.”
They also pointed out that Lilly cannot be said to have “lacked the words to describe”
pemetrexed ditromethamine (quoting Festo II) because Lilly’s previous patents, as well as the
European companion to the asserted patent, claimed pemetrexed salts generally and pemetrexed
disodium in a dependent claim.
The Federal Circuit rejected these arguments, finding the defendants’ view of prosecution history
estoppel, and the tangential exception in particular, too rigid, noting that “tangential” means
“touching lightly or in the most tenuous way.” The court found that the reason for Lilly’s
amendment was to narrow the original claims to avoid prior art that only discloses treatments
using methotrexate, a different antifolate.
28

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Hospira, Inc., 933 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
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To overcome a clear anticipation, Lilly opted to narrow its original claim 2 and its
dependents to more accurately define what it actually invented, an improved
method of administering pemetrexed. In other words, the particular type of salt to
which pemetrexed is complexed relates only tenuously to the reason for the
narrowing amendment, which was to avoid [the prior art]. We therefore hold that
Lilly’s amendment was merely tangential to pemetrexed ditromethamine because
the prosecution history, in view of the ’209 patent itself, strongly indicates that the
reason for the amendment was not to cede other, functionally identical, pemetrexed
salts. 29

The Federal Circuit also rejected the generic companies’ suggestion that Lilly must prove that it
could not have drafted a claim that literally encompassed pemetrexed ditromethamine, finding
the suggestion to be “excessive” and unsupported by precedent, while observing that “[w]e do
not demand perfection from patent prosecutors, and neither does the Supreme Court (citing Festo
II). Lilly’s burden was to show that pemetrexed ditromethamine was ‘peripheral, or not directly
relevant,’ to its amendment, [and] Lilly has done so.”
The Federal Circuit also rejected the argument that the disclosure-dedication rule barred Lilly
from asserting infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. The patent sets forth its invention
as an improved method of administering antifolates, and teaches that the derivatives described in
the Akimoto patent are preferred examples of antifolates 30. A generic company defendant
argued that one of these derivatives is pemetrexed ditromethamine and that it was dedicated to
the public when Lilly declined to do so. The court disagreed, holding that Lilly’s patent does not
disclose methods of treatment using pemetrexed ditromethamine, and, as a result, Lilly could not
have dedicated such a method to the public.
The court noted that, under Federal Circuit precedent, “[s]ubject matter is considered disclosed
when a skilled artisan can understand the unclaimed disclosed teaching upon reading the written
description, but not any generic reference necessarily dedicates all members of that particular
genus.”
Akimoto’s formula includes seven functional group variables and encompasses
thousands of compounds, and while Akimoto discloses about fifty exemplary
compounds, none of them is pemetrexed. Moreover, Akimoto does not even
disclose tromethamine expressly but only generically among dozens of other salts.
At most, Akimoto discloses ammonium salts generally, which is far from a
description of tromethamine. In similar circumstances, we have held that
“sufficient description of a genus” requires that a skilled artisan be able to “
‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the genus.” See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of
Id.
This is the sentence of the patent disclosure the references the Akimoto patent: “Preferred examples of antifolates
include Tomudex®, as manufactured by Zeneca; Methotrexate®, as manufactured by Lederle; Lometrexol®, as
manufactured by Tularik; pyrido[2,3-d]pyrimidine derivatives described by Taylor et al in U.S. Pat. Nos. 4,684,653,
4,833,145, 4,902,796, 4,871,743, and 4,882,334; derivatives described by Akimoto in U.S. Pat. No. 4,997,838;
thymidylate synthase inhibitors as found in EPO application 239,362; and most preferred, Pemetrexed Disodium
(ALIMTA), as manufactured by Eli Lilly & Co.”

29
30
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Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568–69 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). Akimoto does
not so describe pemetrexed ditromethamine, and we see no reason why a skilled
artisan would set out on [the defendant’s] winding path to cobble together
pemetrexed ditromethamine. While the ’209 patent teaches that pemetrexed
disodium is the “most preferred” antifolate, that knowledge would not change the
skilled artisan’s understanding of what Akimoto discloses. Because Akimoto
contains only a “generic reference” to pemetrexed ditromethamine we conclude
that it was not dedicated to the public. 31

Finally, addressing the merits of the doctrine of equivalents analysis, a defendant argued that
“the chemical differences between sodium and tromethamine—e.g., pH, buffering capacity, or
solubility—render the methods in which each is administered to a patient substantially different.”
But the Federal Circuit found no clear error in the district court’s findings that:
the generic product will accomplish an identical aim, furnishing the same amount
of pemetrexed to active sites in the body; in exactly the same way, by diluting a
pemetrexed salt in an aqueous solution for intravenous administration. Indeed,
after dilution and immediately before administration, DRL’s product is
functionally identical to Lilly’s in that it contains the same amount of diluted
pemetrexed anion. 32

Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Amneal Pharm. LLC (2020)

The patents at issue in this ANDA action relate to low-dose doxycycline formulations to treat,
among other diseases, acne or rosacea. 33 The patent claims that were found to be infringed under
the doctrine equivalents by Amneal’s proposed generic product recited compositions of
doxycycline having an Immediate Release (IR) component and a Delayed Release (DR)
component, combined into one unit for once-daily dosing. Claim 1 of the ’740 patent is
illustrative:
1. An oral pharmaceutical composition of doxycycline, which at a once-daily
dosage will give steady state blood levels of doxycycline of a minimum of 0.1
μg/ml and a maximum of 1.0 μg/ml, the composition consisting of (i) an immediate
release (IR) portion comprising 30 mg doxycycline; (ii) a delayed release (DR)
portion comprising 10 mg doxycycline; and optionally, (iii) one or more
pharmaceutically acceptable excipients.

The doctrine of equivalents issue arose with respect to the “delayed release (DR) portion
comprising 10 mg doxycycline.” The district court construed the term “delayed release” or
“DR” to mean “release of a drug at a time other than immediately following oral administration.”
The court found no literal infringement, presumably because the accused product lacked a DR
portion comprising 10 mg of doxycycline. However, the district court found that Amneal’s
product contains a DR portion of doxycycline and a separate portion of doxycycline that is not

933 F.3d at 1335.
Id. at 1335-36.
33
Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Amneal Pharm. LLC, 806 F. App'x 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
31
32
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available for release until a time “other than immediately following oral administration,” and that
these portions together satisfy the DR limitation under the doctrine of equivalents.
On appeal the Federal Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court had not clearly erred in
finding infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 34 Amneal’s product is manufactured by
layering doxycycline in a manner such that doxycycline is released at various intervals. The
Federal Circuit explained that, because a portion of the doxycycline is prevented from releasing
immediately, the later-releasing portion of doxycycline is released “at a time other than
immediately following oral administration.” Therefore, this later-releasing portion, “in
combination with [the DR portion of doxycycline], is insubstantially different from the [claimed]
10 mg DR portion.” Furthermore, the district court concluded that Amneal’s product’s
combination “performs the same function in the same way to achieve the same result as the
[claimed] 10 mg DR portion.”
The court rejected Amneal’s argument that Galderma was precluded from asserting infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents due to argument-based estoppel. In particular, during an inter
partes review (IPR) of the infringed patent claims, the patent owner sought to distinguish the
claimed DR portion over the prior art by arguing that “ ‘a DR portion’ as claimed in the [patent]
requires no substantial release from the portion until some time other than promptly after
administration – and in particular, until after the DR portion passes through the acidic stomach
and sections of the GI tract below pH 4.5.” The Board rejected the patent owner’s argument and
instead agreed with Amneal “that the broadest reasonable construction of ‘delayed release,’ in
light of the specification of the [patent], is not limited to formulations requiring that there be no
substantial release in the stomach.” Instead, the Board construed “delayed release” to mean
“release of a drug at a time other than immediately following oral administration,” i.e., the same
construction later adopted by the district court.
The Federal Circuit noted that “statements made by a patent owner during an IPR proceeding can
be considered during claim construction and relied upon to support a finding of prosecution
disclaimer” so long as the statements are “both clear and unmistakable.” The court observed that
prosecution disclaimer “promotes the public notice function of the intrinsic evidence and protects
the public’s reliance on definitive statements made during prosecution,” and that the doctrine is
rooted in the understanding that “[c]ompetitors are entitled to rely on those representations when
determining a course of lawful conduct, such as launching a new product or designing-around a
patented invention.”
Nonetheless, the court went on to conclude that, because the Board rejected the patent owner’s
arguments regarding the meaning of delayed release, the record before the Patent Office clearly
put the public on notice that the meaning of delayed release with respect to the patents is not
limited to formulations requiring that there be no substantial release in the stomach.
While clear and limiting statements made by the patent owner can give rise to
disclaimer, they do not in this case where those statements were clearly and
expressly rejected by the Patent Office. Because the record makes clear to a skilled
34

Id.
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artisan that Patent Owner’s arguments were rejected, those arguments do not
impact claim scope. Accordingly, we see no error in the district court’s conclusion
that Galderma was not precluded by these statements from asserting the doctrine
of equivalents. 35

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Apotex, Inc. (2020)
As discussed previously, Eli Lilly markets pemetrexed disodium (the disodium salt form of the
compound pemetrexed) under the trade name ALIMTA®. The drug is indicated for use in the
treatment of mesothelioma and certain types of lung cancer. Lilly sued Apotex in a HatchWaxman action, alleging that Apotex’s proposed generic product infringes a Lilly patent
claiming methods of administering pemetrexed disodium to a patient (the same patent at issue in
Eli Lilly v. Hospira, discussed above). 36 Apotex's proposed product contains pemetrexed
dipotassium, a different salt form of pemetrexed from pemetrexed disodium, but the district court
nonetheless found infringement under the doctrine equivalents. The district court rejected
Apotex’s argument that infringement under the doctrine equivalents was barred by prosecution
history estoppel. In particular, as originally filed the claims specifically recited “ALIMTA,” but,
in response to an indefiniteness rejection during prosecution, were amended to recite
“pemetrexed disodium”. Apotex argued that the term “ALIMTA,” as used in the patent, refers to
“pemetrexed,” not limited to any particular counter ion, and thus the amendment was narrowing,
thereby triggering prosecution history estoppel. On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed,
agreeing with the district court that the intrinsic evidence (i.e., the patent specification and
prosecution history) clearly specified that “ALIMTA” refers to “pemetrexed disodium,” not
“pemetrexed” generally, and as such the amendment did not narrow the scope of the claim,
rendering prosecution history estoppel inapplicable. 37

Cases finding patentee likely to succeed under the DOE
My research also identified the following two Federal Circuit cases, decided in 2005 and 2007,
in which the court found, in the context of the appeal of a preliminary injunction, a patentee
likely to succeed on an allegation of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents in a HatchWaxman litigation.

Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharm., USA, Inc. (2005)

Quinapril is an angiotensin converting enzyme (“ACE”) inhibitor used to treat hypertension.
According to the patent at issue in this case, many ACE inhibitors including quinapril are
susceptible to degradation due to cyclization, hydrolysis, and oxidation leading to
discoloration. 38 The inventors discovered that cyclization, hydrolysis, and discoloration can be
minimized by using formulations containing a metal-containing stabilizer and a saccharide.
According to the patent, the metal-containing stabilizer prevents both cyclization and
discoloration, while the saccharide prevents hydrolysis. The patent owner, Warner–Lambert,
markets a quinapril formulation that employs the patented technology, sold under the trade name
Id. at 1010-11.
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 2020 WL 7490251.
37
Id.
38
Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharm., USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
35
36
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Accupril®. Accupril uses magnesium carbonate and lactose as it metal-containing stabilizer and
saccharide, respectively.
Ranbaxy filed an ANDA to bring a generic version of Accupril to market that uses
microcrystalline cellulose in place of lactose, thus hoping to avoid a claim limitation that recites
“a suitable amount of a saccharide to inhibit hydrolysis.” Warner–Lambert sued, and in granting
a motion for preliminary injunction the district court found that Warner-Lamber would be likely
to establish literal infringement. The court construed “saccharide,” as the term is used in the
relevant claim, to include “mono—, di—, tri—, and polysaccharides.” In doing so, the court
rejected Ranbaxy's proposed construction of “sugars, including the lower molecular
carbohydrates, specifically mono-and disaccharides.” Microcrystalline cellulose is a
polysaccharide. The court credited expert testimony presented by Warner–Lambert as providing
a persuasive opinion that microcrystalline cellulose does in fact inhibit hydrolysis. The court
went on to determine that even if “saccharides” were construed to mean “sugars,” Warner–
Lambert would likely be able to prove infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s claim construction and its finding that literal
infringement is likely. 39 And given that this was a motion for preliminary injunction, not a
ruling on the merits, the court found it prudent to address the question of infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents. The court affirmed, concluding that, based on the totality of the
circumstances, even if “saccharides” were construed to mean “sugars,” microcrystalline cellulose
can be fairly characterized as an insubstantial change from the claimed subject matter without
rendering the “saccharide” limitations meaningless. The court noted that it was perfectly
appropriate for the district court to credit the testimony of Warner–Lambert's expert, Dr.
Brenner, explaining that microcrystalline cellulose does in fact inhibit hydrolysis, and other
evidence that microcrystalline cellulose, like sugars, performs the function of inhibiting
hydrolysis. The court explained:
Moreover, microcrystalline cellulose, a polysaccharide, is a substance having
many monosaccharide units, which are the building blocks of sugars. These
similarities convince us that microcrystalline cellulose can be fairly characterized
as an insubstantial change when compared to “sugars.” Moreover, such a
characterization would not render the claim limitations meaningless. Thus, the all
limitations rule does not preclude application of the doctrine of equivalents in this
case.

Ranbaxy argued that, as a matter of law, microcrystalline cellulose cannot be an equivalent of a
“saccharide” because the patentee dedicated microcrystalline cellulose to the public by
disclosing, but not claiming, its use in the patent. One alleged disclosure is a listing of “modified
cellulose derivatives” as an example of a “disintegrating agent.” Another is Example C in the
patent, which discloses a prior art composition containing microcrystalline cellulose. The
Federal Circuit declined to find that microcrystalline cellulose had been dedicated to the public,
holding that “the public notice function of patents suggests that before unclaimed subject matter
is deemed to have been dedicated to the public, that unclaimed subject matter must have been
39

Id.
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identified by the patentee as an alternative to a claim limitation.” The court found that even if
“saccharides” were construed to mean “sugars,” Ranbaxy had not pointed to parts of the patent
where the inventors identify microcrystalline cellulose as an unclaimed alternative that would
function as a “saccharide” and prevent hydrolysis. The court also rejected Ranbaxy’s contention
that Warner–Lambert cannot assert that microcrystalline cellulose is an equivalent to the claimed
“saccharide” because to do so would impermissibly vitiate the “saccharide” limitation.

Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc. (2007)
Abbott Laboratories markets an extended-release clarithromycin product, Biaxin XL®. Andrx
filed an ANDA seeking to market a generic version of the drug, and Abbot sued for infringement
of patent claims reciting extended-release formulations comprising an erythromycin derivative
(e.g., clarithromycin) combined with a “pharmaceutically acceptable polymer.” 40 The
“pharmaceutically acceptable polymer” serves as the release-controlling agent for the claimed
extended-release clarithromycin compositions. Andrx's product does not contain a polymer, but
instead uses glyceryl monostearate (“GMS”) as its release-controlling ingredient.
The district court granted a preliminary injunction, based on its conclusion that Abbott had
shown a likelihood of proving infringement of the asserted claims under the doctrine of
equivalents. The court found that GMS could be functionally equivalent to the required polymer,
because GMS performs the same function, in the same way, to achieve the same result as the
“pharmaceutically acceptable polymer” in the claims. On appeal, Andrx did not argue that the
district court erred in this finding of functional equivalence, and the Federal Circuit affirmed.

Cases finding no infringement under the DOE
In the following Federal Circuit decisions, the court rejected allegations of infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents in Hatch-Waxman lawsuits.

Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. (2007)

Caraco filed an ANDA seeking FDA approval to market a pharmaceutical composition
containing tramadol and acetaminophen with an average weight ratio of tramadol to
acetaminophen of 1:8.67. Caraco's ANDA expressly requires Caraco's formulation to have a
weight ratio of no less than 1:7.5. In response to Caraco's ANDA, Ortho alleged that Caraco
infringed claim 6 of the ′691 patent, which recites “[a pharmaceutical composition comprising a
tramadol material and acetaminophen], wherein the ratio of the tramadol material to
acetaminophen is a weight ratio of about 1:5.” 41
The district court construed the term “about 1:5” to mean “approximately 1:5, encompassing a
range of ratios no greater than 1:3.6 to 1:7.1.” Based on this construction, there was no literal
infringement, and the district court further found no infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. Relying on the doctrine of claim vitiation, the court concluded that finding

40
41

Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 473 F.3d 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 476 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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infringement by Caraco's formulation with an average weight ratio of 1:8.67 would render
meaningless the “about 1:5” limitation.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found no error in the district court’s determination. It found that
the 1:5 parameter was critical to the invention, given that the patent disclosed and claimed a
number of other ratios and ratio ranges. Furthermore, the patent specification employs 95%
confidence levels, which the court found rendered them relevant to determining the scope of the
invention. “An infringement analysis that stretches the bounds of the “about 1:5” limitation
beyond those confidence intervals directly conflicts with the patent's express claim to both the
1:1 and the 1:5 ratios.”

Schwarz Pharma, Inc. v. Paddock Labs., Inc. (2007)
Schwarz markets Univasc, a branded drug containing moexipril hydrochloride (“MH”), an ACE
inhibitor, as its active ingredient. Schwarz has an exclusive license, with respect to moexipril,
under Warner–Lambert’s U.S. Patent 4,743,450 (“the ′450 patent”). Notes that this is the same
patent that the court found likely to be infringed under the doctrine equivalents in Pfizer v. Teva
by Ranbaxy’s generic version of Accupril, as discussed above.
Paddock filed an ANDA for approval to market generic tablets (“the Paddock drug”) containing
MH and magnesium oxide (“MgO”). Schwarz sued for infringement of the ‘450 patent. 42 The
asserted claims recite as one limitation “a suitable amount of an alkali or alkaline earth metal
carbonate.” MgO is not an alkali or alkaline earth metal carbonate, i.e., an oxide is not a
carbonate, so there was no literal infringement. The district court rejected Schwarz’s argument
that the Paddock drug infringed under the doctrine equivalents, based on prosecution history
estoppel, and on appeal the Federal Circuit affirmed.
The district court determined as a matter of law that arguments made by the inventors and
amendments to each of the independent claims made in response to an obviousness rejection did
not result in argument-based estoppel, but did result in amendment-based estoppel. Originally,
the independent claims recited a “metal containing stabilizer” and “an alkali or alkaline earthmetal salt,” respectively, but, following the rejection, each was amended to instead recite “an
alkali or alkaline earth metal carbonate.” The court held that the change in claim language was a
narrowing amendment and presumptively surrendered all metal containing stabilizers and alkali
or alkaline earth metal salts except alkali and alkaline earth metal carbonates. The court also held
that Schwarz had failed to rebut the presumption of surrender because, magnesium oxide was a
foreseeable equivalent of magnesium carbonate and because there was no objectively apparent
reason for the narrowing amendment not directly related to the use of magnesium oxide. The
court thus concluded that the Paddock drug could not infringe because Schwarz was estopped
from claiming that the magnesium oxide used by Paddock was the equivalent of an alkali or
alkaline earth metal carbonate.
On appeal, Schwarz argued that estoppel does not apply in this case, as it had never claimed
compositions and processes involving MgO, and thus there was no surrender when the claims
42

Schwarz Pharma, Inc. v. Paddock Labs., Inc., 504 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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were amended. In support of its argument, Schwarz pointed to the following disclosure in the
specification:
The alkaline stabilizers of the invention include the inorganic salts of metals of
Groups I and II of the Periodic Table.. . . The anionic portion of the salt employe[d]
may be any which does not deleteriously affect the stability of the overall
formulation. Thus, borates, silicates, and carbonates are contemplated.

Schwarz argued that this passage defined “metal containing stabilizer” and “an alkali or alkaline
earth-metal salt” such that the anion had to be a borate, silicate, or carbonate, and thus an oxide
would not fall within the scope of the original claims, and thus was not surrendered by
amendment. But the Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that the specification defined the anion
more broadly as “any which does not deleteriously affect the stability of the overall
formulation.” Borates, silicates, and carbonates were simply listed as examples. There was no
dispute that the time the application was filed oxide was a well-known anion for use in
pharmaceutical compositions, and that it would not “deleteriously affect the stability of the
overall formulation.” The court found that since the amendment was made in response to an
obviousness rejection by the examiner, it is presumed to have been made for reasons of
patentability. Therefore, the court held that the presumption of surrender applies to MgO because
it clearly falls within the territory between the language of the original and the amended claims
of the ′450 patent.
On appeal, Schwarz also argued that even if the presumption of surrender applies, there remained
genuine issues of material fact as to whether MgO was a foreseeable equivalent of an alkali or
alkaline earth metal carbonate. Schwarz did not seriously dispute that MgO was known as a
stabilizer by those of skill in the art at the time of the amendment, but rather insisted that MgO
had to have been known as a stabilizer against the specific degradation pathway of cyclization, or
for the specific drug category of ACE inhibitors, in order to have been foreseeable as an
equivalent. The Federal Circuit disagreed, noting that:
[w]hile care must be taken not to sweep too broadly in defining the field of an
invention, Schwarz attempts to define the field of invention too narrowly. The
language of original claim 1 (and that of issued claim 1 as well) began with the
words “[a] pharmaceutical composition which contains,” and the language of a
claim defining an invention defines the field within which foreseeability may be
considered. The scope of the claim thus supports the district court's treatment of
the field of invention as pharmaceutical compositions rather than being limited to
pharmaceutical stabilizers that inhibit cyclization in ACE inhibitors. We therefore
conclude that, because MgO was known as a stabilizer in the field of
pharmaceutical compositions, Schwarz has failed to rebut the presumption of
surrender by demonstrating that MgO was not a foreseeable equivalent.

Finally, Schwarz also argued that prosecution history estoppel does not apply because the
amendment in question bore no more than a tangential relationship to the equivalent in
question, viz., MgO. The amendment was made in direct response to an obviousness rejection
based on a prior art patent that disclosed the use of magnesium stearate, an alkaline earth metal
salt that is not a carbonate, with an ACE inhibitor. The Federal Circuit found that:
24
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[T]he use of MgO is directly implicated by the amendment of the claim language
at issue because the language amended concerns the types of stabilizers covered
by the claims and excludes MgO. The fact that the inventors may have thought
after the fact that they could have relied on other distinctions in order to defend
their claims is irrelevant and speculative; the inventors chose to distinguish over
the [prior art] by narrowing the range of claimed stabilizers to exclude the one
disclosed in [the prior art], as well as others. 43

The court concluded that “the narrowing amendment was directly related to the range of
equivalents that Schwarz now seeks to recapture.”

Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc. (2009)

Abbott Laboratories, the patentee in this case, markets crystalline cefdinir under the trade name
Omnicef. The FDA approved Lupin's ANDA to market a generic version of Omnicef.
Significantly, Lupin's generic product contains almost exclusively the Crystal B form of
crystalline cefdinir (cefdinir monohydrate), whereas Abbott's Omnicef product contains the
Crystal A form of crystalline cefdinir (cefdinir anhydrate).
Abbot sued for infringement of a patent claiming the Crystal A form of crystalline cefdinir
(cefdinir anhydrate). 44 The district court held that Lupin’s Crystal B product did not literally
infringe, and did not infringe under the doctrine of equivalents. The Federal Circuit affirmed.
Significantly, the asserted patent claims priority to a Japanese patent application that disclosed
and claimed two crystalline forms of cefdinir, “Crystal A” and “Crystal B.” Despite using the
Japanese application for priority, the U.S. patent's specification only discloses Crystal A, not
Crystal B. The court noted that the patent could have claimed the known Crystal B formulation,
which was known to the inventors because it appeared in their priority Japanese application. But
because they chose not to claim Crystal B, the court held that Crystal B compounds, most
relevantly cefdinir monohydrate, fall outside the scope, literal or equivalent, of the asserted
claims.
The Federal Circuit explained that:
Abbott cannot extend its exclusive right [] under the doctrine of equivalents to
embrace known but unclaimed subject matter. In other words, Abbott effectively
disclaimed Crystal B during prosecution of the [U.S.] patent, by removing the
Crystal B disclosure from the parent [Japanese] application and emphasizing the
sole teaching of Crystal A in communications with the PTO as well as in the [U.S.]
specification itself. Abbott cannot now recapture that unclaimed subject matter
under the doctrine of equivalents because the Eastern District properly interpreted
[the claims] to limit “crystalline” to Crystal A. To expand that claim term to
embrace Crystal B would ignore the specific claim limitations of the patent.
Alternatively this court notes that this case seems to fit within the dedication
doctrine that forecloses invocation of the doctrine of equivalents. The patent
43
44

Id. at 1377-78.
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applicant clearly knew of the Crystal B forms of the claimed invention because it
claimed and disclosed them in its Japanese priority application. Yet it declined to
claim an embodiment expressly disclosed in its priority document, thus dedicating
that embodiment to the public and foreclosing any recapture under the doctrine of
equivalents. See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046,
1054 (Fed.Cir.2002).

The court had this to say about the relationship between “bioequivalency” in the context of a
generic drug under Hatch-Waman, and “equivalent” infringement:
Abbott also asserts that Lupin effectively admitted infringement by equivalents
when it claimed before the Food and Drug Administration that its cefdinir generic
was a bioequivalent to Abbott's Omnicef product. While bioequivalency may be
relevant to the function prong of the function-way-result test, bioequivalency and
equivalent infringement are different inquiries. Bioequivalency is a regulatory and
medical concern aimed at establishing that two compounds are effectively the same
for pharmaceutical purposes. In contrast, equivalency for purposes of patent
infringement requires an element-by-element comparison of the patent claim and
the accused product, requiring not only equivalent function but also equivalent way
and result. Different attributes of a given product may thus be relevant to
bioequivalency but not equivalent infringement, and vice versa. As the Northern
District of Illinois observed in the Sandoz case, “[i]f bioequivalency meant per se
infringement, no alternative to a patented medicine could ever be offered to the
public during the life of a patent.” Sandoz PI Order, 486 F.Supp.2d at 776. Thus,
while potentially relevant, the bioequivalency of an accused product with a product
produced from the patent at issue is not sufficient to establish infringement by
equivalents. 45

Reckitt Benckiser Inc. v. Watson Labs., Inc. (2011)

Reckitt obtained FDA approval to market its Mucinex® products, bilayer tablets containing
guaifenesin (an expectorant useful for relieving congestion) in both immediate release (“IR”) and
sustained release (“SR”) formulations. Watson filed an ANDA to market its own generic
guaifenesin tablet formulations, and Reckitt sued for patent infringement. 46
The asserted claims recite “A modified release product having two portions, wherein a first
portion comprises a first quantity of guaifenesin in an immediate release form which becomes
fully bioavailable in the subject's stomach and a second portion comprises a second quantity of
guaifenesin in a sustained release form ….”
As originally filed, the application resulting in the patent included claims directed to “[a]
sustained release pharmaceutical formulation” and were not limited to a bilayer or two-portion
structure. In response to the examiner’s rejection of all the original claims for obviousness, the
applicants cancelled those claims and added new claims, all of which were directed to “[a]
modified release tablet having two portions.” In remarks accompanying that amendment, the
applicants stated that, to facilitate prosecution, they were relinquishing claims directed to
45
46

Id. at 1298.
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guaifenesin sustained release (SR) formulations. The applicants also distinguished their new
claims over the two cited prior art references, arguing that the new claims, unlike the prior art,
required two portions.
Watson's accused products are non-layered polymer matrix tablets made from a single
guaifenesin formulation. The district court construed “portion” as “a discrete part of the
product,” and found that Watson's products do not have separate IR and SR portions, and thus do
not literally infringe the patent. The court concluded that during prosecution Reckitt had
disclaimed products lacking two discrete structural portions during prosecution of the patent.
Further, the court found no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, because the “two
portions” structural limitation is not present in Watson's products, and because Watson's tablets
achieve bioavailability in a different way from the claimed tablets.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed. With regard to the district court’s finding of
noninfringement under the doctrine of equivalents, the court observed that:
[O]n the facts of this case, prosecution history estoppel bars Reckitt from
recapturing single-formulation SR guaifenesin tablets like those it disclaimed in
obtaining the ′ 252 patent. As the district court correctly noted, Reckitt's narrowing
claim amendments were made for reasons of patentability. When, in response to
an examiner's rejection, a patent applicant submits an amended claim set, the
applicant's “decision to forgo an appeal and submit an amended claim is taken as
a concession that the invention as patented does not reach as far as the original
claim.” We, like the district court, take Reckitt's unambiguous prosecution
disclaimer as a concession that the asserted claims of the ′252 patent do not extend
to single-formulation SR tablets such as Watson's accused products. 47

Duramed Pharm., Inc. v. Paddock Labs., Inc. (2011)

Conjugated estrogens, used in hormone replacement therapies, are extremely water sensitive and
thus highly susceptible to moisture degradation during storage. Duramed developed a
formulation for conjugated estrogens that includes a moisture barrier coating (“MBC”) to inhibit
the absorption of moisture and reduce storage-related degradation. Duramed filed a patent
application with an original claim that recited a conjugated estrogen pharmaceutical composition
“coated with a moisture barrier coating.” The claim was rejected as obvious, and the Duramed
overcame the rejection by amending the claim to recite “a moisture barrier coating comprising
ethylcellulose.”
Duramed filed suit against Paddock, alleging infringement of the patent based on Paddock's
ANDA for a generic version of Duramed's hormone replacement therapy product, Cenestin®. 48
Paddock’s proposed generic product would not literally infringe because it does not include
ethylcellulose; instead, its MBC uses a polyvinyl alcohol (“PVA”). Paddock moved for
summary judgment of noninfringement, arguing that Duramed was barred by amendment-based
prosecution history estoppel from alleging that PVA met the “moisture barrier coating
comprising ethylcellulose” limitation of the asserted claims. In its motion for summary
47
48
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judgment, Paddock relied on several pre-amendment references, including an international patent
application (“the Colorcon PCT”), published prior to the claim amendment, that discloses
formulations of PVA-based MBCs. In a section entitled “Description of the Prior Art,” the
Colorcon PCT notes several technical drawbacks of using PVA as an MBC.
The district court granted Paddock's motion for summary judgment of noninfringement, holding
that prosecution history estoppel barred Duramed's infringement allegations. The district court
first held that Duramed's amendment adding the ethylcellulose limitation was substantially
related to patentability and narrowed the scope of the asserted claims, thus triggering the
presumption under Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1366–
67 (Fed.Cir.2003) (en banc ) (“Festo IX ”), that Duramed had surrendered all territory between
the original and amended claim scope.
The district court then held that Duramed had failed to rebut the Festo presumption based on an
argument of, inter alia, the unforeseeability of the use of PVA as an MBC in a pharmaceutical
formulation. Rather, the court held that PVA MBCs were foreseeable at the time of Duramed's
narrowing amendment, based on the Colorcon PCT's description of PVA as “a moisture barrier
coating for pharmaceutical tablets and the like,” and its disclosure of the Opadry AMB
formulation used in Paddock's proposed generic product. The court rejected Duramed's
argument that the Colorcon PCT's disclosure of PVA MBCs' technical drawbacks raised serious
questions about PVA's effectiveness as an MBC, concluding that “even if the effectiveness of
PVA was unknown in 1998, that would not mean that PVA MBCs were unforeseeable.”
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that Duramed had failed to rebut the
presumption of prosecution history estoppel based on unforeseeability. The court noted that,
to the extent that Duramed argues that foreseeability requires that PVA must have
been known as an MBC for use with conjugated estrogens, we have previously
rejected such a restrictive definition of the field of invention. See Schwarz Pharma,
Inc. v. Paddock Labs., Inc., 504 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed.Cir.2007). As we spelled
out in Schwarz, when the language of both original and issued claims begins with
the words “[a] pharmaceutical composition,” that language defines the field of the
invention for purposes of determining foreseeability. Accordingly, PVA MBCs
need only to have been known in the field of pharmaceutical compositions as of
the time of Duramed's narrowing amendment, which we hold that the Colorcon
PCT establishes as a matter of law. 49

Spectrum Pharm., Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. (2015)

The relevant patent claims are directed to a pharmaceutical composition comprising a mixture of
(6S) and (6R) diastereoisomers of leucovorin, “said composition being of a quantity at least
sufficient to provide multiple doses of said mixture of (6S) and (6R) diastereoisomers in an
amount of 2000 mg per dose.” Leucovorin is a compound used to ameliorate the toxic effects of
methotrexate, a chemotherapy treatment (“methotrexate rescue”); to treat folate deficiency; and
to enhance the efficacy of a 5–fluorouracil cancer treatment (“5–FU combination therapy”).
49
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Spectrum, the exclusive licensee of the patent, holds the approved New Drug Application for a
levoleucovorin formulation, which it markets under the trade name Fusilev. Sandoz submitted
an ANDA seeking approval from the FDA for a drug product that will be imported in the form of
single-use vials with 175 mg or 250 mg of levoleucovorin, and Spectrum sued for infringement
of the patent. 50
The district court construed the term “said composition being of a quantity at least sufficient to
provide multiple doses of said mixture of (6S) and (6R) diastereoisomers in an amount of 2000
mg per dose ” as having its plain and ordinary meaning, which required the composition to
contain “enough of the (6S)/(6R) mixture to provide two or more doses of, at minimum, 2000 mg
per dose.” After construing the claims, the district court granted Sandoz's motion for summary
judgment of noninfringement of claims 5–9. Comparing the product described in Sandoz's
ANDA to the claims of the ′ 829 patent, the court found that, because the individual vials will
contain only up to 250 mg of levoleucovorin, the approved product would not satisfy the claim
limitation of at least two doses of 2000 mg. The court also rejected Spectrum's argument that an
aggregation of Sandoz's approved product—that is, the total amount of levoleucovorin drug
product to be imported—would infringe the claims.
The district court further found that Spectrum was precluded from asserting infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents because of statements made by the inventors during prosecution. The
court cited various instances in the prosecution history in which the applicants had distinguished
over the prior art by emphasizing that the application claims (that issued as the asserted claims)
had “more stringent quantity limitations” than other application claims lacking that limitation.
As a result, the court found “a clear and unmistakable surrender of subject matter covering
pharmaceutical composition quantities less than what is required to provide two or more doses
of, at minimum, 2000 mg per dose of the mixture.”
The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding Spectrum estopped from invoking the doctrine of
equivalents by claim amendments and distinguishing statements on the prior art made during
prosecution. The court found that:
When submitting an amendment with the application claims that eventually issued
as [the claims at issue], the applicants asserted that the newly added claims
“include specific limitations as to quantities of materials,” and distinguished the
prior art by pointing to the “quantities of these specific mixtures specified in the
claims.” Those claims were also added following an office action rejecting the
previous original claims as obvious in view of [the prior art]. The applicants again
explicitly highlighted the significance of the dosage limitation during an appeal to
the Board, their brief stating that the claims “require a minimum of four grams,”
the “quantity limitations set forth in the claims” which “define an aspect of the
invention that is of great practical significance.” The applicants unequivocally
argued that [the prior art], which allegedly only produced experimental quantities,
“do[es] not teach, suggest, or otherwise render obvious the claimed
compositions in the quantity specified ” in the application claims that became [the
50
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claims at issue]. Those statements are clear and unmistakable expressions of the
applicants' intent to surrender coverage of quantities of the compound in lower
doses. 51

Indivior Inc. v. Dr. Reddy's Labs., S.A. (2019)

Indivior markets and holds the New Drug Application (“NDA”) for Suboxone sublingual film
(“Suboxone Film”), an opioid addiction treatment that combines two active ingredients: the
opioid buprenorphine and the opioid antagonist naloxone. Suboxone Film is applied below a
patient's tongue, where it then rapidly dissolves to release the active ingredients. In 2010, the
FDA approved Indivior's film product, the first such product to gain FDA approval. Previously,
Indivior sold buprenorphine/naloxone only in a tablet form.
DRL, a generic company, filed an ANDA to market generic versions of Suboxone Film, and was
sued by Indivior for allegedly infringing a patent directed to uniform pharmaceutical films. The
relevant claims recite a film comprising, inter alia, an active ingredient, PEO, and a hydrophilic
cellulosic polymer (HCP). DRL substituted polyvinyl pyrrolidone (“PVP”) for HCP in its ANDA
product, thus avoiding literal infringement, but Indivior argued that DRL's product infringed
under the doctrine of equivalents. The district court held that DRL's product does not infringe
under the doctrine of equivalents because the '150 patent disclosed PVP as an alternative to HCP,
but did not claim it, thereby dedicating it to the public. 52
On appeal, Indivior argued that the district court erred in concluding that the disclosurededication rule applied. But the Federal Circuit disagreed, and affirmed. The court found it
relevant that:
the patentee claimed a film comprising a polymer component made up of PEO
and HCP but disclosed “useful water[-]soluble polymers,” including both HCP and
other polymers such as PVP. The specification further describes examples of
successful films using polymeric blends of PEO and PVP without HCP. These
disclosures teach that PVP, an unclaimed embodiment, is an alternative to HCP
and thus is dedicated to the public and cannot be recaptured through the doctrine
of equivalents. 53

Amgen Inc. v. Amneal Pharm. LLC (2020)
Amgen holds an approved New Drug Application for Sensipar, a formulation of cinacalcet
hydrochloride used to treat secondary hyperparathyroidism in adult patients with chronic kidney
disease who are on dialysis, and to treat hypercalcemia in patients with parathyroid cancer and
primary and secondary hyperparathyroidism. Piramal filed an ANDA seeking to enter the market
with a generic version of Sensipar, and Amgen brought suit alleging infringement of a patent
directed to a rapid dissolution formulation of cinacalcet. 54

Id. at 1338.
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As originally filed, the relevant patent claim recited, inter alia, “at least one binder.” During
prosecution, the Examiner conducted a telephone interview with Amgen’s counsel, and Amgen
accepted an amendment proposed by the examiner (“Examiner’s Amendment”). The Examiner’s
Amendment revised the “at least one binder” limitation so as to put it in Markush group format.
The Examiner then allowed the claims. As amended, the claim recites “at least one binder
selected from the group consisting of povidone, hydroxypropyl methylcellulose, hydroxypropyl
cellulose, sodium carboxymethylcellulose, and mixtures thereof.”
The district court found that Piramal does not infringe because it does not meet the binder
limitation. Piramal uses pregelatinized starch. Amgen argued that the cold-water soluble fraction
of the starch is equivalent to povidone, a listed binder. The court rejected this argument as barred
by prosecution history estoppel. In the court’s view, Amgen had narrowed its claims by
accepting the Examiner’s Amendment to exclude binders different from those listed in the
Markush group.
On appeal, Amgen first argued that the presumption of estoppel does not apply here because it
did not narrow the binder or disintegrant limitations for reasons of patentability. Amgen points to
the absence of any statements by the Examiner about the Markush groups in particular and
Amgen’s own later statement in a second Request for Continued Examination that the language
added by the Examiner was not added in “response to a prior art rejection but rather to place the
claims in proper format and to better define the claimed subject matter, including equivalents.”
Amgen further argued that, even if the presumption of estoppel applies, it had been overcome
because the Markush limitations were added for reasons other than patentability. Amgen argued
that the Examiner’s Amendment simply explained in more explicit terms and clarified the
composition that the claims already covered. Because the Markush groups and treatment
limitations were already present in previously rejected dependent claims, Amgen argued that a
person of skill would have understood from the intrinsic record that the Examiner’s Amendment
was not related to patentability.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, however, and found Amgen’s doctrine of equivalents argument
barred by prosecution history estoppel. The court found Amgen’s reading of the prosecution
history, under which the Examiner proposed the Examiner’s Amendment for no purpose at all,
“at best unpersuasive.”
The court further noted that Amgen’s statement in its second Request for Continued Examination
that the Examiner’s Amendment was added “to place the claims in proper format and to better
define the claimed subject matter,” was made over eight months after the Examiner’s
Amendment was accepted and the claims were allowed. Thus, it was “unclear what, if any,
insight this conventional boilerplate statement provides into the reasons for the Examiner’s
Amendment.”

Eagle Pharm. Inc. v. Slayback Pharma LLC (2020)

Eagle Pharmaceuticals Inc. (“Eagle”) markets a branded bendamustine product, BELRAPZO, for
use in the treatment of chronic lymphocytic leukemia and indolent B-cell non-Hodgkin
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lymphoma. Slayback Pharma LLC (“Slayback”) filed a new drug application (“NDA”) for a
generic version of BELRAPZO, and Eagle sued for patent infringement. 55
The asserted claims recite a non-aqueous liquid composition comprising, inter alia,
bendamustine and a “pharmaceutically acceptable fluid comprising a mixture of polyethylene
glycol and propylene glycol.” Slayback’s product does not contain propylene glycol (“PG”), but
it does contain ethanol, which Eagle argued is insubstantially different from the PG in the
claimed composition, and thus Slayback’s product infringes the “pharmaceutically acceptable
fluid” limitation under the doctrine of equivalents.
The district court entered a judgment of non-infringement on the pleadings. The court
determined that the written description of the asserted patents unambiguously and repeatedly
identifies ethanol as an alternative to PG. For example, the Summary of the Invention discloses
that:
In other aspects of the invention, the bendamustine-containing compositions
include a) a pharmaceutically acceptable fluid which contains one or more of
propylene glycol, ethanol, polyethylene glycol, benzyl alcohol and glycofurol, and
b) a stabilizing amount of a chloride salt.

Likewise, the specification teaches that:
Preferred pharmaceutically acceptable fluids include PG, PEG or ethanol in this
embodiment of the invention.

The district court concluded that it had “sufficient context to decide a question of law—i.e., that
the disclosure-dedication doctrine applies to bar Eagle’s claims for infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents.
On appeal, Eagle argued that the disclosure-dedication doctrine does not apply because the
asserted patents do not disclose ethanol as an alternative to PG for the claimed embodiment
containing an antioxidant. Eagle contended that the asserted patents disclose three distinct
“categories” of bendamustine formulations: (i) chloride salt formulations; (ii) antioxidant
formulations; and (iii) dimethyl sulfoxide (“DMSO”) formulations. According to Eagle, a
skilled artisan would recognize that the three separate categories “have separate ingredients[ ]
and work in different ways.” Eagle asserted that the specification only discloses ethanol as an
alternative to PG when discussing the unclaimed chloride salt formulations; it never discloses
ethanol as an alternative to PG when discussing the claimed antioxidant formulations. As a
result, Eagle concludes, a “skilled artisan would not understand that ethanol ... is an alternative to
PG in the separate, claimed ‘PEG/PG/antioxidant’ category of formulations.”
The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that the disclosure-dedication doctrine does not require
the specification to disclose the allegedly dedicated subject matter in an embodiment that exactly
matches the claimed embodiment. Instead, the disclosure-dedication doctrine requires only that

55
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the specification disclose the unclaimed matter “as an alternative to the relevant claim
limitation.”
The Federal Circuit concluded that:
the asserted patents disclose ethanol as an alternative to PG in the
“pharmaceutically acceptable fluid” claim limitation. The specification repeatedly
identifies—without qualification—ethanol as an alternative pharmaceutically
acceptable fluid. Aside from the description of certain exemplary embodiments,
nothing in the specification suggests that these repeated disclosures of ethanol are
limited to certain formulations, or that they do not extend to the claimed
formulation. 56

The Federal Circuit distinguished over its holding in Pfizer, explaining that in Pfizer:
the claim limitation-at-issue recited a specific purpose: “a suitable amount of a
saccharide to inhibit hydrolysis.” The asserted alternative, microcrystalline
cellulose, was disclosed in the specification without any relation to hydrolysis. As
a result, we were “not convinced that one of ordinary skill in the art would come
to the conclusion that the inventors have identified microcrystalline cellulose in
that formulation as an alternative to a ‘saccharide’ that prevents hydrolysis.”
In this case, the claim limitation-at-issue has only one stated purpose: that the fluid
be “pharmaceutically acceptable.” Unlike in Pfizer, the specification here
repeatedly discloses ethanol as serving that purpose, i.e., the specification
expressly discloses ethanol as a “pharmaceutically acceptable fluid.” We therefore
hold that the asserted patents dedicated ethanol to the public by disclosing, but not
claiming, ethanol as an alternative to PG in the “pharmaceutically acceptable
solvent” claim limitation. 57

Conclusion
This comprehensive look at the small subset of Federal Circuit decisions in which the doctrine of
equivalents is asserted in the context of Hatch-Waxman litigation supports Kevin Noonan’s
observation that, indeed, the doctrine is experiencing a marked resurgence at the Federal Circuit.
The doctrine never went away entirely, with Hatch-Waxman decisions in 2005, 2006, and 2007
either affirming a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents or, in the context of a
grant of preliminary injunction, finding the patent owner likely to prevail on a theory of
infringement under the doctrine. But a review of recent case law suggests that today’s Federal
Circuit has become more receptive to allegations of infringement under the doctrine, and less
likely to find the doctrine barred by prosecution history estoppel than was the case in the years
immediately following the Festo decisions. In particular, my search (conducted on Westlaw)
going back to 2005 found four decisions in 2019 and 2020 in which a branded drug company
prevailed under a theory of doctrine equivalents. In contrast, I only found a total four such
decisions in the 2005-2018 timeframe.
56
57

Id. at 1176.
Id. at 1176-77.
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Clearly, reports of the doctrine of equivalents’ demise were premature, and it remains a viable
means for branded drug companies to block market entry by generic competitors that manage to
avoid literal infringement of Orange book-listed patents.

34

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4027544

